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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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Let’s start this PhD thesis, the way a regular week might start: it’s Monday 
morning 7:00 AM and the alarm goes off. You might snooze your way in bed for 
15 minutes. Then you finally get out of bed and take a nice, warm shower. 
Afterwards, you make some coffee, and savor this moment because you know 
the coffee at the office is horrible. While preparing breakfast, you notice that you 
find it a bit too cold in the living room, so you turn up the thermostat. Then you 
watch some television to check the news, check the latest sports scores and 
things like that. Before you know it, it’s time to go to work, but before you cycle 
to work, you walk and bring all your used paper to the recycling bin a block away 
from where you live. 
          As illustrated by this hypothetical start of the day, even in just the first few 
hours of a regular day, people make a multitude of decisions that have a direct 
effect on environmental quality, even though this is not always directly visible 
and/or they might not always be aware of it. How long and how warm do you 
shower? How high do you set the thermostat? Do you recycle used paper or just 
throw the used paper in your regular trash bin? Do you cycle to work or go by 
car? These are all questions concerning actions that can occur in the life of many 
people on an everyday basis. Such instances of environmental decision-making 
change the availability of materials or energy from the environment and alter the 
structure and dynamics of ecosystems or the biosphere (cf. Stern, 2000). In some 
cases, environmental decision-making leads people to behave in ways that 
minimize the negative impact on the environment, or even benefit the 
environment. Such behaviors can be labeled as pro-environmental behaviors 
(Steg & Vlek, 2009).  
          The impact of human behavior on the occurrence of environmental 
problems is being increasingly recognized (IPCC, 2007). Climate change arises, 
polar caps are melting and the life of various animal species is threatened as a 
result of environmental pollution. The impact of human behavior on the 
environment grows even more so due to an exponential growth spurt of the total 
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population on Earth over the years – 7.2 billion people and counting – and the 
overall growth in welfare. These two types of growth in terms of welfare and 
population make it crucial that people start making more environmentally-
friendly decisions in their lives, to decrease the detrimental impact of human 
behavior on the environment.  
          In order to stimulate people to act more environmentally-friendly, we need 
to gain a more thorough understanding of what drives people’s environmental 
decision-making. Such knowledge can in a later phase be applied to design 
interventions to maximize the effectiveness of initiatives promoting pro-
environmental behavior. So which factors affect people’s environmental decision-
making?  
 
Calculated environmental decision-making  
The majority of research on people’s motivation to act environmentally-friendly 
has focused on cognitions (Vining & Ebreo, 2002) – mental processes which 
involve thinking and reasoning. This is rooted in the assumption that people act 
as reasoned, calculating human beings when making environmental decisions. 
Examples are the application of the theory of planned behavior (e.g. Harland, 
Staats, & Wilke, 1999; Kaiser, Wolfing, & Fuhrer, 1999), or the norm activation 
model (e.g. De Groot & Steg, 2009) to explain pro-environmental behavior. 
Another example is the provision of feedback to instigate environmentally-
friendly actions by bolstering people’s attitudes or efficacy towards pro-
environmental actions (e.g. Schultz, 1999). Similarly, initiatives from policy 
makers and practitioners to promote pro-environmental behavior are often based 
on the premise that people decide whether to act environmentally-friendly in a 
reasoned and calculating way. Consequently, people are assumed to act 
environmentally-friendly if they consider this to be worth the effort (Dogan, 
Bolderdijk, & Steg, 2014). Examples include environmental campaigns that stress 
the negative environmental impact of littering, government subsidies to install 
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solar panels, or the provision of energy labels on appliances to inform people 
about the energy efficiency of these appliances. If people indeed make calculated 
environmental decisions, they should be more motivated to act in a pro-
environmental manner when they anticipate it would for instance save them 
more money or when they learn that certain actions are better for the 
environment. But do people always make environmental decisions in such a 
calculating way? 
 
Environmental decision-making based on feelings 
While approaches appealing to people’s calculations have had some success in 
explaining and instigating pro-environmental behavior, this has not always been 
the case. For instance, the provision of feedback has not always been effective in 
encouraging people to act more environmentally-friendly (see for a review 
Fischer, 2008), suggesting that a change in people’s cognitions or perceived 
efficacy towards pro-environmental actions is not necessarily sufficient to make 
people behave in more pro-environmental ways.  
          Some scholars proposed other factors to explain and instigate pro-
environmental behavior, most notably the role of people’s feelings (Vining & 
Ebreo, 2002). Feelings are generally described as the subjective experience of 
emotions (e.g. Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Fox, 2008). When a 
person is said to feel something, he or she is in fact experiencing emotions. So 
when feelings are discussed throughout this PhD thesis, it is implied that a person 
is experiencing emotions. Yet, the role of feelings in environmental decision-
making has rarely been studied. This is surprising, considering the bulk of 
psychological literature suggesting that overall, people’s decisions are often based 
on feelings. Feelings can affect decisions without any form of reasoning preluding 
the decisions (Zajonc, 1980). Consequently, decision-making based on feelings 
often occurs through a relatively fast, more automatic process (e.g. Kahneman, 
2003; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007), suggesting that people do 
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not have to elaborate that much when they make decisions based on feelings. 
Finucane and colleagues (2000) proposed that representations of objects and 
events are tagged with a certain degree of feelings in people’s minds. People can 
use these feelings as a cue when making decisions, which is also known as the use 
of the affect heuristic (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). 
Consequently, people can prefer objects and events that give them a positive 
feeling over objects and events that give them a less positive feeling, or even 
negative feeling, which guides their decision-making. Relying on feelings is a 
relatively efficient way of decision-making, as it helps people to save resources – 
for instance time and mental effort – that can be used for other purposes (Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2005).  
          People generally lack the cognitive resources to make calculated decisions 
over and again. Just think about all the times where you are in a hurry or have to 
deal with multiple tasks at the same time. This might be the case when going to a 
supermarket where you might not only be in a hurry, but also have to deal with 
many choices per product category, many discount offers, and all this while 
talking to your partner who came with you for the grocery shopping. In such 
instances, making decisions based on feelings can be functional in the sense that 
it can help people to make faster decisions (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2007), because less elaboration is needed compared to situations 
where decisions are based on calculations. In fact, a growing body of literature 
suggests that the main function of people’s reasoning is not to decide what to do, 
but rather to generate post-hoc explanations for their decisions (Mercier & 
Sperber, 2011). Particularly when people make decisions in the moral domain, the 
decision itself is often based on feelings (Haidt, 2001): acting morally can make 
people feel good about themselves, a phenomenon that is also known as feeling a 
warm-glow (Andreoni, 1990; 1995), while feeling bad about oneself after not 




          Existing research indicates that feelings can play a role in people’s 
environmental decision-making. This has particularly been demonstrated in risk 
perception research. The environmental decisions that people make can involve 
risk protecting actions such as protecting oneself from heat waves, which can 
undermine people’s health (Levefre et al., 2015), or the risk of flooding (Zaalberg, 
Midden, Meijnders, & Calley, 2009). Feelings have been shown to play a role in 
how people perceive those risks and people’s likelihood of engaging in risk 
protecting behavior (Levefre et al., 2015; Zaalberg, Midden, Meijnders, & Calley, 
2009). In this PhD thesis I aim to build on these indications that feelings can play 
a role in environmental decision-making, using a somewhat different scope than 
the risk perception domain. I will look at how feelings can play a role in 
environmental decision-making as a result of the implications for people’s self-
concept. I test the notion that pro-environmental actions can potentially benefit 
people in the sense that they derive a positive self-signal from their actions. 
Consequently, I will not exclusively look at benefits and risks in terms of the 
environmental impact of people’s environmental decision-making, but 
particularly in terms of how such decisions affect people’s self-concept and how 
they will subsequently feel about themselves.  
          The starting point for this reasoning lies in the premise that pro-
environmental behavior is often regarded as moral behavior, as others in both 
present and future generations, nature and the environment benefit from it at 
some personal expense (e.g. De Groot & Steg, 2009). Because of the moral 
connotation of pro-environmental behavior, environmental actions can serve as a 
self-signal for people, thus having implications for people’s self-concept (Van der 
Werff, Steg, & Keizer, 2013). It has been suggested that such implications to the 
self-concept as a result of environmental actions can affect how people will feel 
about themselves (e.g. Bolderdijk et al., 2013). Consequently, feelings might help 
to explain people’s environmental decision-making, because such decision-
making is regarded as moral and therefore has implications for people’s self-
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concept. However, studies that systematically study the role of feelings in 
explaining people’s environmental decision-making are still rare. I aim to fill this 
gap in this PhD thesis.  
 
This PhD thesis 
In this PhD thesis, I reason that people’s environmental decision-making is not 
always as calculating as is assumed to be the case. Conversely, I argue that feelings 
can play an important, as yet not fully recognized, role in explaining why people 
decide to act environmentally-friendly. Specifically, I argue that because of its 
moral connotation, environmental decision-making has implications for people’s 










Figure 1 Conceptual model tested in this PhD thesis 
 
          The reasoning that is shortly outlined above (see also Figure 1), is tested 
step-by-step in three empirical chapters in which I explore to what extent feelings 
can lead to a better understanding of environmentally-friendly actions, and why 
this would be the case. More specifically, I will first examine to what extent 
environmental decision-making is not only a matter of people being calculating, 
but whether anticipated feelings also affect how likely it is that people will act 








feelings that are a result of people’s previous environmental decision-making 
have an effect on their environmental decision-making in the near future 
(Chapter 3). After determining to what extent feelings can affect people’s 
environmental decision-making, I aim to gain more insights into why such 
feelings are elicited. I reason that feelings are elicited because environmental 
decisions can serve as a self-signal, thus having implications for people’s self-
concept. In this respect, particularly the experience of self-related emotions is 
relevant. To get an indication of the role that people’s self-concept plays in 
eliciting feelings, I examine whether stronger self-related emotions are 
experienced under conditions where environmental decision-making should have 
more implications for the self-concept (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 builds on Chapter 
3 by directly testing to what extent the strength of the self-signal that people 
derive out of their environmental actions affects how people feel about 
themselves. Specifically, I explore to what extent acting environmentally-friendly 
can be experienced as intrinsically rewarding, which would be visible in people 
deriving a positive self-signal out of acting environmentally-friendly. Deriving a 
positive self-signal in turn can affect how people feel about themselves as a result 
of their environmental actions, which can lead to a literal warm-glow as reflected 
in a higher ambient temperature perception (Chapter 4).  
          Please note that in the conceptual model as it is presented in Figure 1, 
feelings can be seen both as an outcome variable and a process variable. In as far 
as environmental decision-making serves as a self-signal, such decisions can elicit 
feelings (outcome variable). But when looking at the model holistically, it can be 
seen that feelings are expected to be part of the underlying process explaining 
future environmental decision-making as well, as people may anticipate feelings 






Environmental decision-making: guided by calculations or feelings?  
As previously stated, the majority of the research focusing on people’s motivation 
to act environmentally-friendly has focused on people’s cognitions (Vining & 
Ebreo, 2002), based on the premise that people’s decisions regarding whether to 
act in a pro-environmental manner are made in a reasoned and calculating way. 
One implication of this premise is that the value that people place on a particular 
action should be mainly based on the amount of (tangible) benefits resulting from 
engaging in that action, rather than on how an action would make people feel. 
Hsee and colleagues (2005) call this the “valuation by calculation” mechanism. 
Here, the larger the benefits are perceived to be (like larger monetary savings) 
relative to the costs of an action, the more value people place on the action, 
which should make it more likely that people will adopt the action. This 
mechanism is based on traditional economic theory, where “more is better” 
because larger (tangible) benefits of the action increase the utility of the action 
(Hsee, Rottenstreich, & Xiao, 2005). When larger benefits are perceived, it would 
be a calculating move to adopt the action, or at least make it more likely that the 
action is adopted.  
          This “valuation by calculation” mechanism suggests that people follow a 
reasoned process to make their decisions, as people will likely need at least some 
degree of elaboration on the perceived quantity of the prospected benefits of an 
action: “Do I find these benefits a lot of very little? Is this worth the effort?”. To 
get an empirical indication of the degree of this elaboration, I examine whether 
the “valuation by calculation” mechanism affects environmental decision-making 
via the extent to which people find it worth the effort to act environmentally-
friendly. I expect that the higher the perceived benefits are relative to the 
perceived costs, the more worth the effort people will find these actions, which in 
turn affects the likelihood of people acting in a pro-environmental manner 
(Dogan, Bolderdijk, & Steg, 2014). A determination of how worth the effort an 
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action is necessitates elaboration as people need to weigh the benefits of an 
action to the costs of this action.  
          Hsee and Rottenstreich (2004) however identified a second valuation 
mechanism called “valuation by feeling”. In this case, how much value people 
place on a certain action is particularly driven by how they (expect to) feel about 
that action. The stronger these anticipated positive feelings are, the more likely it 
is that people will actually engage in that action. Research has suggested that 
when decision-making is based on feelings, decisions can be made both with and 
without elaboration (e.g. Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Kahneman, 2003; 
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007). The mechanisms of “valuation by 
calculation” and “valuation by feeling” are conceptually related to dual process 
theories which posit that System 1 processes are mostly intuitive and automatic, 
while System 2 processes are more reflective and controlled (Evans, 2003; 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The affective basis of the mechanism of 
“valuation by feeling” can be seen as a source that leads to people engaging in a 
System 1 process when making decisions, as the feelings can act as a heuristic 
(Finucane et al. 2000). On the other hand, “valuation by calculation” requires 
some form of reasoning and elaboration and would therefore involve System 2 
processes, as it involves a certain degree of reflection. 
          I argue that the prospect of people feeling good about themselves when 
acting environmentally-friendly can affect their environmental decision-making as 
well, particularly given the moral connotation of pro-environmental behavior (De 
Groot & Steg, 2009). Even though it is not always inherently pleasurable to act 
environmentally-friendly (for instance when showering shorter and/or colder, 
which is good for the environment, but not inherently pleasurable to do), people 
can expect to feel good about acting in such a way because they may perceive it as 
the right thing to do. This reasoning is based on the premise that when people 
make decisions that carry a moral connotation, such decision-making is usually 
based on feelings (Haidt, 2001). The prospect of positive feelings that can be 
 
17 
achieved as a result of doing the right thing, by acting environmentally-friendly, 
can motivate people to engage in such actions (Lindenberg, 2001).  
         The reasoning above implies that pro-environmental actions cannot only be 
promoted by appealing to people’s calculations, but also by appealing to how 
good people will expect to feel when acting environmentally-friendly. Appealing 
to the mechanism of “valuation by feeling” instead of “valuation by calculation” 
to encourage certain actions might be especially fruitful when the tangible 
benefits of the relevant actions are relatively low or even absent. Notably, the 
latter is often the case when it comes to pro-environmental behavior, as acting in 
more environmentally-friendly ways generally leads to little or even no tangible 
benefits such as monetary savings and because acting in environmentally-friendly 
ways can be costly (Steg et al., 2014). Consequently, appealing to people’s 
calculations might not be particularly fruitful when attempting to get people to 
act more environmentally-friendly, as in many cases people will likely perceive the 
prospected (tangible) benefits of pro-environmental actions to be relatively low  
(Bolderdijk & Steg, 2014).  
          In sum, Chapter 2 aims to examine to what extent people’s environmental 
decision-making is based on people’s feelings, as opposed to their calculations. So 
far, the effect of anticipated positive feelings on environmental decision-making 
relative to the effect that people’s calculations have on this decision-making has 
not been tested. I test the hypothesis that in addition to the effect of “valuation 
by calculation”, anticipated positive feelings can affect people’s environmental 
decision-making, thus testing whether the mechanism of “valuation by feeling” 
can also affect how likely it is that people will decide to act environmentally-
friendly. With this design, I can also compare the strength of the effect of 
“valuation by feeling” to the effect of “valuation by calculation” on people’s 
environmental decision-making, to get an indication of which valuation 
mechanism more strongly affects people’s environmental decision-making. I also 
examine whether making environmental decisions requires elaboration, by 
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examining whether decisions are preceded by an assessment of the perceived 
worthiness of environmental actions.  
          I first look at the effect on people’s environmental decision-making of how 
people expect to feel when making pro-environmental choices (Chapter 2). But 
feelings can of course also be elicited after people previously engaged in 
environmental behavior. To what extent might these feelings have an effect on 
people’s subsequent environmental decision-making? Hsee and colleagues (2005) 
did not make a specific distinction between the effect of how people expect to 
feel or how people actually feel on people’s decision-making, thus both types of 
feelings might be relevant in people’s decision-making via the mechanism of 
“valuation of feeling”. In Chapter 3, I look at the extent to which feelings that are 
a result of people’s previous environmental actions have an effect on their 
environmental actions in the near future. This way I can explore the extent to 
which how people expect to feel and how people actually feel as a result of 
previous environmental actions affect their future environmental decision-
making. 
 
The self-signal of pro-environmental actions eliciting feelings 
After first establishing the extent to which feelings affect people’s environmental 
decision-making, the next step in this PhD thesis is to focus more on the 
underlying process of why this is the case. Where do these feelings arise from? In 
Chapter 3, I propose that people’s environmental actions have implications for 
their self-concept, which subsequently affects how people feel about themselves. 
In this respect, I expect that specifically self-related emotions are elicited, which 
are emotions that are experienced because people’s self-concept is affected. More 
specifically, given that pro-environmental behavior carries a moral connotation, 
this suggests that people can be motivated to act environmentally-friendly, 
because such actions reflect that they do the right thing, which can serve as a 
positive self-signal (Van der Werff, Keizer, & Steg, 2013). When people feel good 
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about themselves because their self-concept is boosted, they could particularly 
experience the self-related emotion of pride (Ben-Ze'ev, 2001). Alternatively, 
when people feel bad about themselves because their self-concept is threatened, 
they may particularly experience the self-related emotion of discomfort (Elliot & 
Devine, 1994).  
          I use multiple research designs in order to provide a more complete picture 
of the theoretical account that environmental decisions elicit feelings because they 
impact people’s self-concept (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). I test my 
theoretical account indirectly in Chapter 3, by looking at whether stronger 
feelings are elicited under conditions where people’s self-concept is likely to be 
more strongly affected as a result of their environmental decisions. In Chapter 4, 
I test directly to what extent the self-signal of environmental decisions is relevant 
in eliciting feelings, by looking at whether this self-signal of environmental 
decisions mediates the relation between people’s environmental decision-making 
and how people feel about themselves. In both Chapter 3 and 4 social 
comparison feedback is used as an instrument to communicate how 
environmentally-friendly people’s previous environmental actions are, by 
comparing one’s environmental actions to that of a reference group.    
          I reason that the extent to which environmental actions have implications 
for people’s self-concept, and in turn affect how these actions make people feel, 
depends on how environmentally-friendly or environmentally-harmful people 
believe they are acting. In Chapter 3, I examine two factors that may affect how 
people perceive their own environmental friendliness: people’s involvement in 
environmental issues, and the composition of a reference group to which one 
compares one’s environmental actions. The reference group composition affects 
what reference point people use in order to estimate how environmentally-
friendly one’s actions are.   
          Involvement is defined as the extent to which an issue – in this case, 
environmental issues – is seen as personally relevant (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & 
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Rodriguez, 1986; Göckeritz et al., 2010). I expect that the more people are 
involved in environmental issues, the stronger the implications of their 
environmental actions are for their self-concept, and the stronger their 
environmental actions elicit self-related emotions. More specifically, I hypothesize 
that the higher people’s level of involvement in environmental issues is, the more 
strongly their self-concept is threatened when people receive negative social 
comparison feedback – where they learn they act relatively environmentally-
unfriendly – leading to stronger feelings of discomfort.  
          In contrast, when people receive positive social comparison feedback – 
where they learn they are acting relatively environmentally-friendly – the self-
concept can receive a boost, leading to stronger feelings of pride after acting 
environmentally-friendly. From a theoretical standpoint, the effect of people’s 
level of involvement in environmental issues on people’s self-concept and 
eliciting feelings is less clear when people learn they act environmentally-friendly. 
Performing environmentally-friendly is more important to the self-concept of 
higher involved people, suggesting that acting environmentally-friendly should 
elicit stronger pride among higher involved people. But people can also be biased 
in that they accept favorable outcomes more quickly than unfavorable outcomes, 
because this boosts their self-concept, therefore relating any positive outcome to 
the self (Blaine & Crocker, 1993). If such a bias is present, any positive outcome 
can serve as a positive self-signal, leading to levels of experienced pride that do 
not systematically depend on people’s level of involvement in environmental 
issues. 
          Many indicators on people’s environmental performance are hard to 
interpret for people. It is for instance difficult to estimate how environmentally-
(un)friendly it is to emit a certain amount of CO2-emissions (Karjaleinen, 2011). 
People can more accurately learn how environmentally-friendly their 
environmental actions are by comparing their environmental actions to that of 
other people. Social comparison feedback provides a potent reference point to 
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judge one’s own environmental actions by showing the environmental 
performance of a reference group (Schultz, 2010). The information about the 
amount of CO2-emissions of a reference group makes it more diagnostic how 
environmentally-friendly one’s own amount of CO2-emissions is, making it easier 
to estimate how environmentally-friendly (or environmentally-harmful) one’s 
actions are.  
          People can compare their environmental actions to different groups, that 
are likely to differ in how environmentally-friendly they are perceived to be. To 
illustrate, environmentalists might be perceived as being very environmentally-
friendly, while the opposite can be the case for business representatives. If a 
person would learn that he acts less environmentally-friendly than business 
representatives, this can serve as a more potent negative self-signal: it implies that 
one’s own actions are really environmentally-unfriendly. Conversely, when a 
person would hear he acts less environmentally-friendly than environmentalists 
this would not be as upsetting – acting less environmentally-friendly than 
environmentalists does not seem to make one’s environmental performance to be 
very bad, as such an outcome could have been expected. For simplicity, we label 
a reference group that is perceived as stereotypically environmentally-unfriendly a 
“low standard” reference group. A reference group that is perceived as 
stereotypically pro-environmentally is labeled a “high standard” reference group 
throughout this PhD thesis.  
          Based on my earlier reasoning that mainly highly involved people’s self-
concept will be threatened when receiving negative social comparison feedback 
on one’s environmental actions, I expect that particularly highly involved people 
will be affected emotionally when being outperformed by a “low standard” 
reference group. Hence, I hypothesize that discomfort is particularly experienced 
when highly involved people learn they act less environmentally-friendly than a 
“low standard” reference group, because in this case one’s actions seem very 
environmentally-harmful, which threatens the self-concept of higher involved 
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people. In contrast, when highly involved people are outperformed by a “high 
standard” reference group, this does not make one’s actions seem particularly 
harmful for the environment so in this situation less discomfort should be 
experienced by them.  For people who are less involved in environmental issues, 
how pro-environmental their environmental actions are has less implications for 
their self-concept. Consequently, for low involved people the composition of the 
reference group is expected to have less implications for their self-concept, and 
thus for the amount of discomfort that they experience when receiving negative 
social comparison feedback.  
          Again, given the potential self-serving bias that people can display when it 
comes to positive information, it is theoretically less clear how the reference 
group composition and people’s level of involvement in environmental issues 
affect people’s self-concept and elicit pride after receiving information indicating 
that they are acting environmentally-friendly. Therefore, I take an explorative 
approach to study the role of people’s level of involvement in environmental 
issues and of the composition of the reference group to which one compares 
one’s environmental actions to on the extent to which pride is elicited as a result 
of acting environmentally-friendly.  
 
The self-signal of acting environmentally-friendly leading to a “warm glow” feeling 
The final step in this PhD thesis is to directly test whether the feelings that 
environmental actions elicit in people are a result of the extent to which this 
behavior serves as a self-signal. Because of the implications to the self-concept, 
people can be intrinsically motivated to act environmentally-friendly, making pro-
environmental actions intrinsically rewarding. In Chapter 4, I examine whether 
acting environmentally-friendly can be intrinsically rewarding in a way that these 
actions affect how people feel about themselves, using their ambient temperature 
perception as a proxy for how they feel about themselves.   
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          People can be intrinsically motivated to engage in a certain action because 
they feel it is the right thing to do, which allows them to act in line with their self-
concept and make them feel good about themselves (Lindenberg, 2001; Van der 
Werff, Steg, & Keizer, 2013). As was previously discussed, people are also said to 
experience a “warm-glow” when they do the right thing, because such behavior 
makes them feel good about themselves (Andreoni, 1990, 1995). When people 
experience something as intrinsically rewarding, their insula becomes activated 
(Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2013), which may occur when people make moral 
decisions (Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008). Insula activation also occurs when people 
process thermal perception (Kang et al., 2011). Consequently, when the insula is 
activated, people’s ambient temperature perception can be affected in the sense 
that people can perceive it to be warmer (Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2013).  
          Thus, when acting morally in the form of acting in a pro-environmental 
manner is indeed experienced as intrinsically rewarding, this should activate 
people’s insula and affect people’s perceptions of the ambient temperature. In 
other words: when people feel good about themselves as a result of their 
environmental actions, and experience this as intrinsically rewarding, these 
positive feelings can take the form of a literal warm-glow feeling by perceiving a 
higher ambient temperature. Therefore, I hypothesize that compared to people 
who learn they act environmentally-unfriendly, people who act environmentally-
friendly perceive a higher ambient temperature, thus experiencing a literal warm-
glow. 
          Importantly, in Chapter 4, I further test my earlier reasoning that acting 
environmentally-friendly (or environmentally-unfriendly) can serve as a self-
signal, and therefore affect how people feel about themselves. I hypothesize that 
the stronger the implications of people’s environmental actions are on their self-
concept, the more this should affect how they feel about themselves, as reflected 
in their ambient temperature perception. Hence, I test whether the extent to 
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which acting environmentally-friendly leads to a literal warm-glow is mediated by 
the extent to which these actions serve as a self-signal. 
 
Summary 
In sum, in this PhD thesis I study to what extent feelings can explain people’s 
environmental decision-making and where these feelings arise from. I start by 
exploring to what extent feelings affect people’s environmental decision-making, 
relative to people’s calculations, and how much elaboration is involved in 
environmental decision-making based on either feelings or calculations (Chapter 
2). Subsequently, I examine why feelings might affect environmental decision-
making and where these feelings arise from. I propose that people’s 
environmental decision-making serves as a self-signal, thus having implications 
for people’s self-concept, which affects how people feel about themselves. I first 
use a research design testing this theoretical account indirectly (Chapter 3). If my 
reasoning is correct, I should find that stronger self-related emotions will be 
experienced under conditions in which people’s environmental actions should 
have stronger implications for the self-concept (Chapter 3). Next, I directly test 
the extent to which people’s environmental actions serve as a self-signal and 
affect how people feel about themselves (Chapter 4). I expect that pro-
environmental actions will serve as a positive self-signal for people, which makes 
people feel good about themselves, as is reflected in a warm-glow feeling in the 
form of a higher perceived ambient temperature. On the other hand, 
environmentally-harmful actions will serve as a negative self-signal for people, 
which makes them feel bad about themselves, as is reflected in a cold-prickle in 
the form of a lower perceived ambient temperature (Chapter 4). The three 
empirical chapters take the form of three separate papers, therefore there will be 
some overlap in the text describing the theoretical reasoning between the papers. 
Due to differences in journal formats, the structure of the empirical chapters 
differ in some aspects. 
